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Abstract 
This paper searches statistical evidence of tax harmonization initiated and motivated by EU 
Commission since 1980. The purpose of energy tax harmonization is to reach more 
efficient use of energy among members and thereby to establish more competitive markets 
in EU. The tax harmonization in EU, in this work, is analyzed through convergence tests to 
see whether total taxes applied to oil and diesel used by industries and households are 
adjusted among EU members. This study, therefore, employs minimum Lagrange 
multiplier unit root tests with structural breaks developed by Lee and Strazicich (2003). 
Upon observations the data for panels, it is revealed that panels for oil industry tax, diesel 
industry tax, oil household tax and diesel household tax converge to average total taxes of 
members. Time series data for individual countries, on the other hand, give both 
convergence and non-convergence results. 
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1.  Introduction 
The low of one price has been analyzed with great interest in the economics and/or energy literature. 
From this perspective, many searches are realized to explore if one price empirically exists through 
time within cities or states or continents. It seems that the energy products attract more attention than 
other products in the literature of price convergence due to their more environmental and intertemporal 
effects on the societies. To this end, the works on energy price convergence seek to explore whether 
energy prices assemble within time and/or the cross sections especially in EU after Single European 
Act (1987). 
This paper analyzes, on the other hand, energy tax harmonization in EU by two reasons. First, 
there exists an extensive literature on energy price work such as Bentzen (2003), Dreher and Krieger 
(2008), Neumann et al. (2006), Zachmann (2008), Vany and Walls (1999), Ma et al. (2009) which 
conclude mainly price convergence and Robinson (2007) and Siliverstovs (2005) whose findings 
support both convergence and non-convergence in energy prices. The literature on energy tax 
harmonization or energy tax convergence, however, is limited in comparison with that of energy price. 
Secondly, the tax harmonization has been proposed by European Commission (EC) for almost last two 
decades in order for EU members to reach more efficient use of energy. Then, it is needed to access the 
empirical result of EC directives ongoing more than 20 years for tax harmonization between members. 
EU Council Directive 92/81/EEC, Article 1 states that EU members shall impose a harmonized 
duty tax on mineral oils (EU Commission, 1992a). EU Council Directive 2003/96/EC, Article 5 points 
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out that member states may apply differentiated energy tax rates due to energy product quality, energy 
consumption levels, energy for public use, energy for industry use and energy for non industry use (EU 
Commission, 2003). EU Council Directive 2003/96/EC, Article 7 indicates that starting from January 
2004 and from 2010, the tax level on motor fuels shall be fixed and that European Parliament shall 
decide on minimum levels of tax for gas oil not later than 1 January 2012 (EU Commission, 2003). 
These Council directives aim at harmonizing the energy tax rates at a minimum level which is lower 
than the existing rates in EU members, and thereby, establishing a single market. 
Newberry (2001) brings up that, although the existence of EU pressure for harmonizing energy 
taxes, energy is taxed at different rates within all EU countries. These differences in tax rates brings 
about cross border fuel tourism (Rietveld et al., 2001, Wlazlowski et al., 2009). Kohlhaas et al. (2004) 
develop several scenarios on tax harmonization’ possible results in EU and conclude that the 
harmonization might lead to some GDP losses especially in accession economies. Dorigoni and Gull´ı, 
(2002) claim that tax harmonization seems difficult to be realized, and, therefore, they propose a tax 
harmonization as a second best solution model considering each member separately and being 
consistent with EU environmental targets. 
This paper specifically carries out the tests for energy tax harmonization in EU by the 
convergence tests of energy taxes through time and across sections yet the energy taxes practically 
seem to be subject to change from one member to another member. To this end, this work performs 
minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root tests with structural breaks for four panel data sets 
consisting of EU members. These panels are light fuel oil taxes for industries, automotive diesel taxes 
for industries, light fuel oil taxes for households and automotive diesel taxes for households, 
respectively. Paper’s next section describes the data and methodology and Section III gives the results 
of LM unit root tests of panels and individual members for oil and diesel taxes consumed by industries 
and households. 
 
 
2.  Data and Methodology 
The quarterly data is obtained from International Energy Agency (IEA) and the ‘Documentation of 
IEA, Energy prices and Taxes: Beyond 2020 2Q2008 edition’ explains the details for energy tax data 
for OECD countries. Energy taxes represent total tax as of US $/unit for each energy product. In this 
work, EU 15 members are taken into consideration. However, due to data availability, some members 
are dropped from the related panels and to be able to keep the same relatively longer time horizon in 
statistical analyses, among other energy products, the energy data for light fuel oil taxes and 
automotive diesel taxes for industries and households are studied. 
The statistical analyses follow the minimum Lagrange Multiplier (LM) unit root test with 
structural breaks developed by Lee and Strazicich (2003). Their LM unit root tests have some more 
appropriate statistical properties over other unit root tests with structural break(s) of Perron (1989), 
Zivot and Andrews (1992), Lumsdaine and Papel (1997) and Perron (1997) as defined in Lee and 
Strazicich (2003). The LM test performed by Lee and Strazicich (2003) yields unbiased results by the 
assumption of endogenously determined breaks in null hypothesis of unit root tests. Lee and Strazicich 
(2001, 2003) follow a data generating process with unit root together with breaks and conclude that 
when unit root null hypothesis assumes no break, the resulting test statistics provide divergence and 
significant rejections of the unit root null. 
Therefore, the LM convergence tests with two structural breaks are carried out employing time 
series data for individual countries and the data for panels considering the log relative tax for each 
country as in Eq. (1). 
  (1) 
where , log,  and  represent relative total tax of related energy product for 
country i at time t, natural logarithm, total tax of related energy product for country i at time t and the 
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mean of total taxes of countries at time t, respectively. The individual LM unit root test with two 
structural breaks is conducted as 
 (2) 
where  as t = 2,3,…,T. The estimator  is a vector of coefficients obtained from 
the regression of  on ,   and , where , 
j= 1, 2, and  , j= 1,2, denote the dummies for level j and trend j, respectively. The augmented 
terms, , i=1,2,…k, included in Eq. (2) provide the correction for autocorrelation. The null of unit 
root hypothesis is . The panel LM test statistic is performed by Eq. (3) following Im et al. 
(2002, 2005). 
 (3) 
where , N, ,  and  denote the standardized LM panel unit root test statistic, the 
number of cross sections, the mean of individual LM test statistics derived from Eq. (2), the expected 
value and variance of individual LM test statistics, respectively. T represents the number of 
observations less number of augmented terms less 1, instead of actual number of observations of 
sample. The values of  and  are obtained from Table 1 of Im et al. (2002). Im and Lee 
(2001) indicate that Eq. (3) follows standard normal distribution with the values of 2.326, 1.645 and 
1.282 at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (Strazicich et al. 2001). 
Besides tests with two structural breaks, throughout this work, the LM unit root tests with one 
structural break or with no break, when necessary, are also performed. When LM test of  is found 
stationary, then, one may state that the ratio of ith country’s tax implemented on relevant energy 
product to the average total taxes in panel is converged to its mean. Provided that the panel LM test 
statistics are found stationary, then, this result would be statistical confirmation (realization) of the 
energy tax harmonization in Europe as proposed by EU Council Directive. 
 
 
3.  The Unit Root Tests by Minimum LM for Light Fuel Oil and Automotive Diesel 
Taxes 
Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4, show the statistics of LM unit root tests with structural breaks for the total taxes 
applied to light fuel oil and automotive diesel used by industries and households in EU for the periods 
of 1981:3-2007:4, 1979:1-2008:1, 1981:1-2008:1 and 1979:1-2008:1, respectively. The second 
columns from Table 1 to Table 4 denote the LM test statistics of null  in Eq. (2). The third 
columns are the critical values of λ1, = FB/T and λ2 = SB/T where T is the number of observations in 
the series. The critical values are symmetric around λi = (1- λi), i=1,2 as explained in Lee and 
Strazicich (2003) and Strazicich et al. (2004). The forth columns are the number of lagged first 
differenced terms employed in Eq. (2) to correct the serial correlation. The last two columns of FB and 
SB yield the estimated first and second breaks of levels and/or trends in individual tax data. 
 
Table 1: The Unit Root Tests for Light Oil Industry Tax Data (1981:3 - 2007:4) 
 
EU Member Minimum LM 
statistic 
Critical value 
break points 
L FB SB 
Belgium -6.999(*) (λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.8) 1 1994:2(*) 2003:3(*) 
Denmark -9.606(*) (λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6) 8 1995:3(*) 1998:3(*) 
Finland -4.770 (λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4) 8 1986:1(*) 1993:3(*) 
Germany -8.027(*) (λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4) 6 1988:3(*) 1991:2(*) 
Ireland -8.247(*) (λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4) 0 1986:4(*) 1994:1(***) 
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Italy -6.563(*) (λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4) 5 1985:1(*) 1993:3(*) 
Luxembourg -6.408(*) (λ1 =0.6, λ2=0.8) 5 1997:2(*) 2004:3(*) 
Netherlands -5.327(***) (λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4) 1 1987:1(*) 1992:1(*) 
Spain -9.156(*) (λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4) 8 1985:3(*) 1988:4(*) 
Sweden -7.647(*) (λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6) 7 1992:3(*) 1997:3(*) 
UK -4.465 (λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.8) 0 1991:4(*) 2001:4(***) 
Panel -28.630(*)     
Note: (*), (**) and (***) denote %1, %5 and % 10 significance level, respectively. The critical values are obtained from 
Table 2 in Lee and Strazicich (2003). 
 
Table 1 LM statistics find that Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden converge in taxes whereas Finland and UK are observed as 
nonconverged countries. All first breaks (FBs) and second breaks (SBS) are found stationary. The FBs 
mostly cluster around the second half of 1980s and the first half of 1990s whereas SBs accumulate in 
1990s and the first half of 2000s. The Panel LM statistic shows that convergence happens in total taxes 
applied to light fuel oil used by industries within 11 EU members listed in Table 1. 
According to Table 2 results, EU members in the panel, except Austria, Belgium, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Spain and UK, converge in diesel industry taxes. The significant FBs assemble often 
within the periods of 1980-1985 and 1985-1990. The significant SBs cluster in 1990s and initial years 
of 2000s. LM tests with one structural break are run for Austria and Spain since their FBs are not 
significant. Austria again does not converge with the significant one break. Spain’s one break, 
however, is found non-significant. Finally Spain does not show convergence in taxes with no break 
either. Panel LM statistic of -24.956 is found significant at %1 percent level according to the critical 
values for standard normal distribution as defined in Strazicich et al., (2001) and Jewell et al., (2003). 
Although 6 of 14 EU members individually do not have evidence of convergence, the panel result is in 
favor of the realization of tax harmonization for diesel industry taxes between 1979:1 and 2008:1. 
From this statistical result, then, one may claim that Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden are tended to accommodate with energy tax harmonization directive 
of EC. 
Table 3 differs somewhat from Tables 1 and 2 since it deals with consumer behavior rather than 
producer behavior given in Tables 1 and 2. The harmonization of total taxes implemented on light fuel 
oil used by households is met by the panel LM statistics of -27.944 at %1 significance level. Austria, 
France, Sweden and UK seem not to participate in harmonization directive of EC. The FBs and SBs 
are significant except the second break of Italy. The FBs group in 1980s and the first half of 1990s. As 
for the SBs, they scatter in a wider distance than the first ones. They are observed to fall in the second 
half of 1980s, roughly all 1990s and the first half of 2000s. 
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Table 2: The Unit Root Tests for Diesel Industry Tax Data (1979:1 - 2008:1) 
 
EU Member Minimum LM statistic 
Critical value 
break points L FB SB 
Austria -4.716 λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6 0 1991:3 1998:3(*) 
Austria(1) -4.008 λ =0.4 ------ 0 1990:3(**) ------ 
Belgium -4.480 λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6 4 1989:1(*) 1996:1(*) 
Denmark -7.751(*) λ1 =0.6, λ2=0.8 4 1998:3(*) 2001:1(*) 
Finland -5.420(***) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 8 1986:1(*) 1993:1(*) 
France -5.315(***) λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6 8 1989:3(*) 1994:4(*) 
Germany -4.127 λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.8 4 1988:3(*) 2000:3(*) 
Ireland -6.921(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.8 4 1986:2(*) 2000:3(**) 
Italy -8.474(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 7 1984:3(*) 1990:3(*) 
Luxembourg -4.284 λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 6 1984:3(*) 1992:4(*) 
Netherlands -7.173(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.6 7 1986:2(*) 1996:2(*) 
Portugal -6.171(**) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.8 3 1984:1(*) 1999:1(*) 
Spain -7.250(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 7 1986:3 1988:1(**) 
Spain(1) -6.859(*) λ =0.2 ------ 7 1986:4 ------ 
Spain(0) -0.695 ------ ------ 8 ------ ------ 
Sweden -6.158(**) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.6 6 1982:2(*) 1995:2(**) 
UK -3.600 λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.6 7 1985:4(**) 1996:4(*) 
Panel -24.956(*)     
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) denote %1, %5 and % 10 significance level, respectively. All individual statistics, except 
countries denoted by (1) and (0), come from two structural break-LM tests. (1) and (0) indicate LM tests with one 
structural break and without break, respectively. Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2, Lee and Strazicich (2004) and 
Schmidt and Phillips (1992) Table 1A provide the critical values for two structural breaks, one structural break and with 
no break, respectively. 
 
Table 3: The Unit Root Tests for Oil Household Tax Data (1981:1 - 2008:1) 
 
EU Member Minimum LM statistic 
Critical value 
break points L FB SB 
Austria -3.966 λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 7 1988:2(**) 1992:1(*) 
Belgium -5.487(***) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 3 1985:4(*) 1988:3(*) 
Denmark -9.469(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 8 1986:1(*) 1990:3(*) 
Finland -7.584(*) λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.8 0 1993:1(**) 2001:2(*) 
France -5.062 λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.8 1 1992:3(*) 2001:3(**) 
Germany -7.230(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 8 1985:4(*) 1991:3(*) 
Ireland -5.924(**) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 1 1985:2(*) 1987:2(**) 
Italy -7.084(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 5 1985:3(*) 1990:3 
Italy(1) -6.038(*) λ =0.4 ------ 5 1993:2 (*) ------ 
Luxembourg -5.472(***) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 3 1986:1(*) 1993:3(*) 
Netherlands -5.752(**) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.6 1 1987:2(*) 1997:1(*) 
Spain -12.147(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 8 1983:4(*) 1987:4(*) 
Sweden -5.104 λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 8 1984:4(*) 1989:4(*) 
UK -4.259 λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.8 4 1994:1(*) 2002:2(*) 
Panel -27.944(*)     
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) denote %1, %5 and % 10 significance level, respectively. All individual statistics, except 
country denoted by (1), come from two structural break-LM tests. (1) indicates LM tests with one structural break. 
Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 and Lee and Strazicich (2004) provide the critical values for two structural breaks 
and one structural break, respectively. 
 
Finally Table 4 accounts for total taxes for automotive diesel consumed by households between 
the first quarters of 1979 and 2008. Germany, Luxembourg and UK say ‘no’ for the convergence while 
other nine individual members agree with EC Directives. Then, expected outcome of panel, together 
with the nine ‘yes’, would be most likely ‘yes’ too. The statistical reveal of LM with -22.515 confirms 
this agreement of panel with the announcement of tax harmonization by EC in automotive diesel for 
households. The FBs and SBs of household diesel taxes’ scatter points bear no resemblance, on the 
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other hand, to those of household fuel oil, yet both of household total taxes crowd around same time 
intervals. 
 
Table 4: The Unit Root Tests for Diesel Household Tax Data (1979:1 - 2008:1) 
 
EU Member Minimum LM statistic 
Critical value 
break points L FB SB 
Austria -5.676(**) λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.8 5 1990:3(*) 2004:4(*) 
Finland -5.777(**) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 1 1986:1(*) 1992:1(*) 
France -5.759(**) λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6 7 1989:3(*) 1994:3(*) 
Germany -4.417 λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.8 5 1987:1(**) 2000:3(*) 
Ireland -7.354(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.8 4 1985:1(*) 2002:4(*) 
Italy -5.992(**) λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6 6 1989:4(**) 1994:2(*) 
Luxembourg -5.069 λ1 =0.4, λ2=0.6 8 1988:4(*) 1993:3 
Luxembourg(1) -2.733 λ =0.4 ------ 0 1992:4(*) ------ 
Netherlands -6.877(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 1 1985:3(*) 1993:1(*) 
Portugal -5.639(***) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.8 7 1985:3(*) 1999:2(*) 
Spain -7.088(*) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 7 1985:3(*) 1989:2(*) 
Sweden -5.817(**) λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.4 6 1982:2(*) 1989:4(*) 
UK -3.579 λ1 =0.2, λ2=0.6 7 1985:3(**) 1996:4(*) 
Panel -22.515(*)     
Notes: (*), (**) and (***) denote %1, %5 and % 10 significance level, respectively. All individual statistics, except 
country denoted by (1), come from two structural break-LM tests. (1) indicates LM tests with one structural break. 
Lee and Strazicich (2003) Table 2 and Lee and Strazicich (2004) provide the critical values for two structural breaks 
and one structural break, respectively. 
 
The time intervals covering the structural breaks determined throughout this paper imply the 
years of 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, albeit they vary in exact data points. This may recall independent, to 
the some degree, national fiscal policies of the members. All four panels, however, give the evidence 
of statistical significances of tax convergence initiated and motivated by the propose of ‘Report from 
the Commission to the Council on the scope for convergence of tax system in the Community’ in 1980 
(EU Commission, 1980) declaring EEC’s fundamental objectives as; 
i. Establishment a common market by free movement of economic agents, production factors, 
commodities and services and a whole system providing a not distorted competition, 
ii. The ongoing adjustment of the members’ economic policies, 
iii. The association of prevalent policies of energy, environment, regional policies, external trade, 
agriculture and transport. 
After EU Commission 1980 report, The EU energy tax policy becomes more decisive with the 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the approximation of the rates of excise duty on mineral oils (EU 
Commission, 1987), Council Directive on the approximation of the rates of excise duties on mineral 
oils (EU Commission, 1992a) and Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 92/81/EEC 
with regard to the possibility of applying a reduced rate of excise duty on certain mineral oils 
containing biofuels and on biofuels (EU Commission, 2002). From 1980s to 2000s, throughout all 
these reports and/proposals, a common system of excise tax for harmonization including fuels was 
submitted by EC in 1994, and till 1997 harmonizing direct tax was moderate as explained in Kesner-
Škreb (2007). What about 2000s? Kesner-Škreb (2007) seems EU 25 tax harmonization program 
circuitous. This view, of course, considers heterogeneous economic policy structures of 25 EU 
members. Kohlhaas et al. (2004), in general, sees tax harmonization for new members costly together 
with some potential gains for them in the future. The paper handled here, on the other hand, approaches 
more homogeneous EU members rather than EU 25 and finds and empirical evidence of harmonization 
in panels as well as the majority of individual traditional EU members. One may apply the same LM 
tests for EU 25 to reveal the possibility of tax harmonization for today’s EU. Inserting relatively more 
heterogeneous structure of new members into the system, the resulting point is less likely to be 
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identical to this paper. The comparison of traditional members with new members is, of course, another 
subject of interest. 
 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This work seeks energy tax harmonization in EU considering total taxes on light fuel oil and 
automotive diesel used by both industries and households. The quarterly data for the panels of oil 
industry, diesel industry, oil household and diesel household cover the periods of 1981:3 – 2007:4, 
1979:1 – 2008:1, 1981:1 – 2008:1 and 1979:1 – 2008:1, respectively. Time series data on individual 
countries give mix output from the LM unit root tests with two structural breaks. When two structural 
break tests for countries are considered not significant, LM tests with one break and without break are 
performed. Finland and UK, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Spain and UK, Austria, 
France, Sweden and UK and Germany, Luxembourg and UK do not converge in oil industry taxes, 
diesel industry taxes, oil household taxes and diesel household taxes, respectively. The panels for the 
taxes implemented on oil and diesel consumption of industries and households, on the other hand, give 
the same results of convergence. These statistical findings support, on average, the accomplishment of 
tax harmonization of European Union through time although some individual members resist the 
convergence within given period. 
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